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THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FISCAL
RULES: EVIDENCE FROM U.S. STATES
ABSTRACT
This paper shows that in American states balanced budget rules are effective in enforcing
fiscal discipline but they have no costs in terms of increased output variability. More
specifically, we show that tighter fiscal rules are associated with larger average surplus and lower
cyclical variability of the budget balance. However, the lower flexibility of the budget balance








700 19th Street, NW
Washington, DC 204311. Introduction
Recent work on the impact of balanced budget rules on fiscal behavior has identified two
critical questions. First, whether they are effective in enforcing fiscal discipline or, instead,
whether they can be circumvented by creative aaunting. Smnd, if these rules are eff’ive,
what are these benefits in terms of budget discipline versus their costs in terms of lost flexibilityin
fiscal policy. Less flexibility should have costs in terms of output variability both in a neoclassical
fiamewor~ because it limits the ability to tax smooth and in a Keynesian framework, because of
the need for anticyclical policies.1While balanced budget rules are rare for national governments,
various forms of restrictions of this type apply to US states. Furthermore, US states provide a
particularly attractive area for empirical research as most of the rules were imposed long ago,
reducing problems associated with sample selection bias.2
In this paper, by looking at the experience of US state we conclude that balanced budget
rules are effective in enforcing fiscal discipline and they have no costs in terms of increased output
variability. Recent work by Eichengreen (1992), Poterba (1994), Alt and Lowry (1994), Bayoumi
and Eichengreen (1995) and Bohn and Inman (1995) has shown that, indeed, fiscal restrictions on
US states enforce some budget discipline, in terms of lower deficits and/or quicker response to
‘For a recent survey of the literature on budget rules and fiscal institutions see Alesina and
Perotti (1996). On the tax smoothing argument seeBarro(1979) and Lucas and Stokey
(1983).
2SeeBayoumi and Eichengreen (1995) and Ratchford (194 1) for historical details on the
adoption of fiscal rules.negative fiscal shocks at the cost of lowering anticyclical policies. Ptily by drawing on this
previous researc~ we make a very simple point in this paper: the increased discipline generated by
fiscal rules reduces budget flexibility, but it appears to have little or no cost in terms of more
output variability.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a very simple graphical analysis
which makes our basic point in the most elementary possible way. Section 3 presents some
supporting -nometrics evidence. The last section concludes.
2. Budget restrictions, deficits and variability
As our measure of budgetary restrictions we use the variable constructed by Anderson and
the Adviso~ Council on Intergovernmental Relations (1987). This inde~ which varies between O
and 10with a higher number indicating more stringent fiscal controls, has been used by virtually
all earlier researchers into the impact of fiscal controls on US states. As we are interested in the
impact of fiscal controls on overall budgetary policy, we adopt the relatively broad measure of the
budget surplus used in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995). Others (for example, Bohn and Inmq
1995) have focused specifically on the types of expenditures covered by fiscal controls.
Reassuringly, the overall conclusions from both types of data appear similar. All of our analysis is
for the 48 mainland US states.
Figure 1plots the average primary budget surplus as a share of state product for the
2period 1988 to 1992 against our measure of fiscal control.3 The figure shows a positive
relationship indicating that more stringent fiscal controls are associated with higher primary
surpluses. The regression line is as follows: (t-statistics in parenthesis)
PRIMS = 0.0023 + 0.0010 FC
(0.72) (2.62)
(1)
N. ofobs: 48 R*= 0.13
In equation (1) PRIMS is the average budget surplus as a share of state product, and FC is the
measure of fiscal control, increasing in the tightness of the controls.
This relationship is not limited to the primary surplus. Figure 2 plots the average total
surplus as a share of state product for the period 1965-1992. Once again a positive relationship
appears. The regression line is as follows:
S = 0.0040 + 0.0004 FC
(2.11) (1.96)
N. of ohs. 48 R*= 0.08
where S is the average surplus
(2)
1965-1992.
3Thereason for truncating the data period at 1988 is that we were unable to obtain data on
interest payments prior to 1988 from our data source (the WEFA group), although such data
appear to exist. All other regressions use data from 1965-1992.
3Figure 3 plots the standard deviation of the change in the surplus as a share of state
product against the index of fiscal control. This figure shows a negative relationship between
surplus variability ad fiscal controls, indicating that these controls impose some rigidity in the
budget balance. The regression line is as follows:
STS = 0.0082- 0.0003 FC
(10.87) (-2.83)
(3)
N. of ohs: 48 R*= 0.15
where STS is the standard deviation of the change in the surplus as a share of state product over
1965-1992.
The next figure 4 cotirms that the cyclical variability of surpluses is lower in states with
more stringent fiscal controls. Following Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995), this figure is obtained
as follows. First we ran the following regression for each state for the sample 1965-1992.
DSJ,= a,+ b,DYJt + CJSJ(,.l) (4)
where (D)S, is the (change in) the surplus as a share of output in state J and DY is the change in
the logarithm of real output. Figure 4 plots the coefficients b, against our measure of fiscal
controls. The plot shows a negative correlatio~ indicating that more stringent controls are
associated with less cyclical response of the budget. The regression line is as follows:
4b= O.120 - 0.0069 FC
(4.70) (-2,30)
(5)
N. of ohs. 48 R2 = 0.10
Thus, these simple plots and regressions show that tighter fiscal controls impose more budget
discipline but also more budget rigidity.
The critical policy questio~ however, is whether the rigidity imposed by the fiscal mntrol
has economic rests. Figure 5 suggests that the answer is negative, at least if economic costs are
measured in terms of the variability of real state product. This figure plots the standard deviation
of the logarithm of the growth in real state product versus our measure of fiscal controls. No
relationship appears to exist in the data. The regression line is as follows;
YST = 0.0003 - 0.0004 FC
(9.13) (-0.82)
(6)
N. ofobs: 48 R2 = 0.01
where YST is the standard deviation of state product for the sample 1965-92. The coefficient on
the fiscal control variable not ody is statistically insignificant, it also has the wrong sign.
In summary, the larger rigidity imposed by tighter fiscal controls does not seem to have an
impact on state output variability,
53. Regression Analysis
We have run several regressions controlling for a variety of variables. Our results confirm
the basic picture described by the simple plots of the previous section. Table 1reports an example
of these regressions. In these particular regressions we control for the size of the state, measured
as the average of the logarithm of its nominal product between 1965 and 1992, a measure of its
output compositio~ namely the average proportion of nominal output emanating from the mining
sector between 1965 and 1992, and a regional dummy variable for Southern states. It is generally
believed that Southern states have different fiscal behavior from the rest of the country, and this
type of variable has been included in many earlier studies of fiscal policy across states (for
example, EichengreeL 1992 and Bohn and Inmq 1995),
In column 1, which comesponds to figure 1,the dependent variable is the average primary
surplus as a share of state product (averaged from 1988-92). The coefficient on the fiscal control
variable has the expected signs and is significant at the 5 per cent level. The same observation
applies to column 2 which correspond to Figure 2. Here the depended variable is the average
surplus as share of state product for the sample 1965-92. In the third and fourth column which
correspond to figure 3 and 4 respectively the sign on the fiscal control variable is expected to be
negative, and, in fact, it is significatively negative. Finally,the last column which corresponds to
Figure 5 shows no correlation between our measure of fiscal control and state product variability.
Hence, d of our basic results appear robust to the inclusion of these extra regressors in the
regression.
6~eadditiond regressors generally havethe expected signmd impact. Forexample, the
results indicate that larger states have less variable fiscal surpluses and less variability of output,
presumably because their output base is more diversified, but tend to run more counter-cyclical
policies, possibly because fiscal leakages are perceived to be smaller. States with larger
percentages of output devoted to mining and quarrying have greater variability of real output, run
larger surpluses (possibly for prudential reasons) and have surpluses which vary less with the
cycle. More surprising is that fact that Southern states are found to tend to run smaller surpluses
than those in other regions, which appears somewhat out of keeping with the fiscal conservatism
usually associated with the region.
We run several alternative specifications in addition to those reported in table 1. These
included several intermediate regressions in which only some of the additional independent
variables were included, and regressions where, in addition to the proportion of output associated
with mining, we also controlled for the proportion of output in agriculture and in manufacturing.
However, these additional variables were generally insignificant, and hence are not reported. The
qualitative nature of the results was unchanged by these experiments.
Some insight into the reasons for the absence of a relationship between fiscal controls and
output variables can be found by regressing the variability of state product on both the coefficients
b, from the regression of the state budget on output, as a measure of the contribution of
anticyclical policies to stabilizing output, and on the variability of the change in the state surplus,
as a measure of the destabilizing impact of undisciplined fiscal policies. This regression produced
7the following results:
YST = 0.025 - 0.048 CYCLE + 1.694 STS
(5.99) (2.30) (2.47)
N. of ohs: 48 R2= 0.16
(7)
where YST is the standard deviation of state product for the sample 1965-92, CYCLE is the
cyclical coefficient discussed earlier, and STS is the standard deviation of the change in the budget
surplus as a percentage of state product. Anticyclical policies lower the variability of rd state
product, but higher variability of the surplus in general raises it. As fiscal controls reduce both
factors, the net impact on output variability is uncertain. For US states the two itiuences
apparently approximately cancel out, leaving no direct impact from fiscal controls onto output
variability. Unlike the earlier results, however, this regression is not robust to the inclusion of
other explanatory variables. Adding the extra independent variables included in table 1
approximately halves the estimated coefficients and t-statistics on both anticyclical policies and
the variability of the fiscal surplus, although none of the new independent variables are
individually significant at conventional levels.
4. Discussion
Tight fiscal controls which impose restrictions on deficits reduce average deficits and
reduce budget flexibility. However this increased rigidity does not seem to tiect the variability of
state product. This result can have two non mutually exclusive explanations. First, it may be thecase that the stabilizing role of fiscal policy at the state level is simply not very important, so that
reducing its impact does not have a significant effect on product variability. The second
interpretation is that the fiscal restriction not only impede “good” anticyclical policies but also
limit politically motivated and biased policies which may have a destabilizing effect.
These results on fiscal rules at the state level cannot be interpreted as an endorsement of
balanced budget rules for national governments. A recent literature has shown that fiscal
institutions matter for fiscal outcomes for national govemments.4 However, this literature does
not imply that balanced budget rules are desirable. On the contrary, one may argue that
appropriate procedures may enforce fiscal discipline without the need for too constraining
balanced budget rules. In other words, for national governments the tax smoothing and
Keynesian anticyclical policy arguments may be much more important than for state and local
governments. If this is the case the results of this paper suggest that while balanced budget rules
may be effective for subnational political jurisdictions they may not be so for national
governments.
4See in particular Alesina et al. (1996), Eichengreen, Hausmann and von Hagen (1996), von
Hagen and Harden (1994)
9Table 1: Fiscal Controls, Surplus and Variability
Average Standard Standard
Primary Average Deviation of Deviation of
Dependent surplus surplus surplus Cyclical State Product


























































R2 0.27 0.27 0.32 0.38 0.22
‘. In shares of state product
t-statistics in parenthesis.
10References
Alesin~ Alberto, Ricardo Hausm~ Rudolf Hommes and Emesto Stei~ (1996): “Budget
Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Latin Americ~” unpublished.
Alesin~ A., and R. Perotti, (1995): “Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions,” NBER Working
Paper.
Alt, J. and R. hwry, (1994): “Divided Government and Budget Deficits: Evidence for the
States,” American Politiwi Science Review.
Anderso~ G. snd Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, (1987) Fiscal
Discipline in the Federal System: National Reform and the @erience of the States,
(Washington: ACIR).
Barre, R., (1979): “On the Determination of the Public Debt,” Journal of Political Economy, 87:
940-947.
Bayoumi, T., snd B. Eichengree~ (1995): “Restraining Yourself The Implications of Fiscal
Rules for Economic Stabilization” M StiflPapers, March 32-48.
Bo~ H. andR. Inman (1995) “Constitutional Limitations and Public Deficits: Evidence fio U.S.
States,” unpublished manuscript, University of California and Santa Barbara.
Eichengreeq B., (1992): “Should the Maastricht Treaty be Saved?” Princeton Studies in
International Finance, No. 74, December.
EichengreeL B., R. Hausmann and J. Von HageL (1996): “Reforming Fiscal Institutions in Latin
America: The Case for a National Fiscal Council,” unpublished, IDB.
Lucas, R., and N. Stokey, (1983): “Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in an Economy without
Capital,” Jmmal of Monetaiy Economics, 12:55-94.
R)terb~ J., (1994): “State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions and
Politics,” Journal of Political Economy, August, 102:799-821.
Ratchford, B. (1941) American State Debts (Durham, NC: Duke University Press).
Von Hage~ J., and I.J. Harden, (1994): “National Budget Process and Fiscal Performance,”







-0.01 1 I I I I I 1 I I
01234567 8910
Index of Fiscal Controls










@ o 0 0
0
) o 0 0
0
1 I 1 I I I I 1 I 1
01234567 8910
In&x of Fiscal Controls




I I I I 1 I I I I I
012345678 910
Index of Fw1 Controls




































0.01 1 1 I I I I I I I 1
01234567 8910
Index of Fwal Controls